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A trademark is a name, mark, device or sign by means of which
the products of a person or entity may be distinguished from the prod-
ucts of others.1 Trademarks perform four functions: (1) they identify
one's products and distinguish them from those of others; (2) they in-
dicate that products bearing that trademark come from a specific
source; (3) they signify that products bearing that trademark have the
same quality level; and (4) they make a major contribution to the ad-
vertising and selling of these products.2
Often a trademark "becomes the common descriptive name" of a
certain product; at that point the trademark holder will no longer have
"the exclusive right to its use."' 3 There are many names that were once
trademarks that came to be used by the public as the descriptive name
for the product. As I grew up as a child in the 1930s I had no idea that
trampoline, yo-yo, brassiere, escalator, thermos, aspirin, and cello-
phane had once been registered trademarks. They were simply the
names everyone used to describe those products. There were many
other former trademarks that were already generic by then, or became
such in more recent years. Those with which I am most familiar would
include celluloid (film material), granola (oats and fruit bar), jungle
gym (play structure), mimeograph (reproduction machine), pogo stick
(bouncing stick), tarmac (runway), and zipper.4
Trademarks were probably first used by potters about 3500 years
ago to indicate the source of their fired clay pots; the use of marks was
also noted in the Old Testament of the Bible. 5 By at least the 17th and
18th centuries, manufacturers in Britain and the United States were
t Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, A.B., Harvard University, 1950;
J.D., John Marshall Law School, 1966. The valuable contributions of my very capable Re-
search Assistants, Andrea Moroney, Tiffany Karem, and Lori Berko are gratefully
acknowledged.
1 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000).
2 37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 67, §1. (citations omitted).
3 Hans Zeisel, The Surveys That Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 896, 896 (1983).
4 Wikipedia (the free encyclopedia): Genericized trademark, available at http://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/Genericizedtrademark.
5 Sung In, Death of a Trademark: Genericide in the Digital Age, 21 REV. LinG. 159,
162 (2002).
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using names and symbols to identify the source of their products, but
there were very few trademark cases as such. Early litigation usually
involved the tort of "passing off", that is, passing off one's goods as
those of another. Federal statutes providing for trademark registration
were enacted in 1870, 1881, 1905 and 1920. The current federal trade-
mark law, known as the Lanham Act, was passed by Congress in
1946.6
In order to obtain, and keep, trademark protection, the name
used must not be, or become, "primarily understood by the consuming
public as referring, to a product category."'7 Such wods are known at
common law as "generic" "and cannot be exclusively appropriated." '8
Under the Lanham Act, generic words should be denied federal regis-
tration, and any registration granted "is subject to cancellation if at
any time it 'becomes the common descriptive name of an article or
substance.'" 9
In trademark law, all terms have traditionally been divided into
four categories. The first involves terms which are "arbitrary",
"coined" or "fanciful." "Arbitrary" terms are those whose commonly
understood meaning bears little or no relationship to the products to
which they are applied.10 Examples would be "APPLE" computers or
"Camel" cigarettes. A "coined" or "fanciful" term is a word which is
made up, such as "DACRON" or "KODAK."
The second category consists of "suggestive" terms. These terms
convey some information about the products to which they are ap-
plied, but do not give an actual description of the product. An exam-
ple of a "suggestive" term would be "Playboy" for a magazine" or
"Tide" for a laundry detergent.
The other two categories are terms which are "descriptive" and
"generic." Whereas terms in the first two categories are entitled to
registration and protection without offering proof of a "secondary
meaning," because they are presumed to identify the source of the
product,12 a "descriptive" term conveys a description of the nature, or
an important aspect of, the product. An example would be "Park 'N
6 See Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, supra note 2, at 74.
7 Ralph H. Folsom and Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J.
1323, 1323 (1980).
8 Id.
9 Id. (citations omitted).
10 See, e.g., Jellibeans Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 170 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (explaining that "jellybeans" means a kind of candy; if applied to a roller skating
rink, "JELLIBEANS" is an arbitrary term).
11 See generally Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 566 (2d
Cir. 1982).
12 See West & Co. v. Arica Inst., Inc., 557 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Fly" for a long-term parking lot service near an airport.13 It does not,
at the beginning, indicate the source of the product. To achieve trade-
mark protection, the user of the mark must show that the public has
come to identify that term with the source of the product rather than
the product itself.14
Terms which are deemed to be "generic" are "not entitled to
trademark protection because such words are 'in the public domain
and available for all to use' . .. 15 While it might seem that the lines
between these four categories are fairly clear, they are in fact "often
blurred, and 'the difficulties are confounded because a term that is in
one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one
for another...' 1,6 For example, in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunt-
ing World, Inc.,17 Judge Friendly gave the example of the word
"ivory" which is generic with regard to products made from the tusks
of elephants, but arbitrary when applied to soap. 18
The Lanham Act was enacted by Congress to "mak[e] actionable
the deceptive and misleading use of marks" and to "protect persons
engaged in... commerce against unfair competition .... "19 According
to the United States Supreme Court, federal trademark law has two
objectives: protecting consumers' ability to identify and distinguish
among the products of various manufacturers; and protecting the busi-
ness goodwill which a mark symbolizes.20
The Lanham Act itself does not enunciate any standard for deter-
mining if a trademark has become generic. However, Judge Learned
Hand did set forth a test in Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co.:21 "The
single question ... is merely one of fact: What do the buyers under-
stand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?" 22 This
standard is often referred to as the "public perception" test, and
13 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1052, 1064(c)).
14 See 17 Lanham Act §2(f), 15 U.S.C. 1052(f) (2000); see Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.
v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2000) (referring to "The
Sporting News"); see also Zipee Corp. v. U. S. Postal Service, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087
(D. Ore. 2000) (referring to "Postal Service").
15 Cellular Sales, Inc. v. Mackay, 942 F.2d 483, 486 (8th Cir. 1991).
16 Clipper Cruise Line, Inc. v. Star Clippers, Inc., 952 F.2d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).
17 537 F.2d 4, 9 note 6 (2d Cir. 1976).
18 Id.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
20 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854-55 note 14 (1982).
21 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
22 Id. at 509.
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serves the objectives of the Lanham Act to protect valid trademarks
and prevent public confusion as to the source of products.2 3
II.
GENERICIDE
A. Failed Attempts to Acquire Trademark Protection
It is not uncommon for a manufacturer to attempt to acquire or
assert trademark protection for its product only to be told by a court
that the word in question is already being generally used as the ge-
neric term for any product of that type. For example, one hundred
years ago, in Charles R. DeBevoise Co. v. H. & W. Co.,2 4 the com-
plainant asserted a right to the exclusive use of the word "brassiere"
to describe an article of wearing apparel which it manufactured. The
parties agreed that the article in question was "a combined corset
cover and bust supporter" - "a close-fitting, armless jacket, reaching
in a narrow band over the shoulders, and opening at the back. 2 5
The court noted "[tIhat the word 'brassiere' is a familiar French
word, found in all the dictionaries, and means simply 'brace', but in-
cludes, also, the idea of 'restraint'. '2 6 Thus, the court found it to be "a
singularly appropriate name for the article in question," 27 and thus
generic.
A similar example can be found in Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v.
Royal Tops Manufacturing Co.,28 which involved the word "Yo-Yo."
The court found that "'Yo-Yo' [was] a word which originated and was
used in the Philippine Islands as the generic name of the toy . . .." It
was treated by the U.S. public as the generic name of the toy. Recog-
nizing that, Duncan had made a great effort recently (1955) "to fasten
23 See Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 855 note 14; see also Dictaphone Corporation v. Dicta-
matic Corporation, 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 439 (D. Ore. 1978) (stating that in determining
whether there is a likelihood of confusion, a court will consider these factors: "(1)
[s]trength and weakness of the marks; (2) [s]imilarity in appearance, sound and meaning;
(3) [tjhe class of goods in question; (4) [t]he marketing channels; (5) [e]vidence of actual
confusion; (6) [e]vidence of the intention of [the junior user] in selecting and using the
alleged infringing name"); see also Dictaphone Corporation v. Dictamatic Corporation at
439 (stating that "[O]nly a few of the factors need be present to enable a court to find a
likelihood of confusion").
24 60 A. 407 (N.J. Eq. 1905).
25 Id. at 407.
26 Id. at 407-08.
27 Id. at 408.
28 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965).
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upon the toy the generic term, 'return top."' 29 Its effort failed. The
court held that "Yo-Yo" described the product, not the producer. 30
B. Trademarks Become Generic
"An originally non-generic, valid trademark becomes generic and
invalid when the principal significance of the word to the public be-
comes the indication of the nature or class of an article, rather than
the indication of the article's origin."'31 This same process has occurred
frequently over the years. A drug known by pharmacists as "acetyl
salicylic acid" was known to the public as "aspirin." To the public, the
word "aspirin" was the name of the drug, was therefore merely de-
scriptive, and thus generic. 32 Similarly, it was held that most buyers,
whether they were manufacturers, retail dealers or retail customers,
knew no other name for "cellophane." To everyone that word meant a
product used to keep goods "protected and yet completely visible. '33
The same thing happened to the term "escalator." It had "be-
come a descriptive name to both the general public and to engineers
and architects . .. ",34 To everyone, it "mean[t] any moving stairway
without reference to the maker thereof."35
One clearer example can be found in Kellogg Co. v. National Bis-
cuit Co., which involved the use of the name "shredded wheat" on
biscuits in pillow-shaped form.36 The court held that "shredded
wheat" was the generic term for the product, since it described it fairly
accurately, and was the term by which the product was generally
known by the public. 37
A trap into which many trademark holders have fallen is the situ-
ation where a product is patented and thus no one else can manufac-
ture the product for 17 years regardless of what they call it. That is just
what happened to "aspirin"; during the life of the patent Bayer made
no attempt to establish in the minds of the public some generic name
29 Id. at 662.
30 See also Dryice Corp. of Am. v. Louisiana Dry Ice Corp., 54 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.
1932) (stating "The term 'Dry-Ice' [is] descriptive of qualities or characteristics of solid
carbon dioxide," and is thus generic).
31 Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 note 10 (9th Cir. 1982) (empha-
sis by the court) (citation omitted).
32 See generally Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
33 DuPont Cellophane Co., Inc. v. Waxed Products Co., Inc., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir.
1936) (the court noted that buying public would not recognize or use the supposed generic
descriptive phrase: "a transparent glycerinated cellulose hydrate regenerated from
viscose...").
34 Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80, 81 (Comm'r. Pat. 1950).
35 Id.
36 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
37 Id. at 116.
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for the product other than "aspirin." In fact, they welcomed the public
acceptance and use of "aspirin" as the name of the drug. By the time
the patent expired, it was too late. "Aspirin" was generic. 38 The same
thing happened to "linoleum" long ago.39 An inventor obtained pat-
ents for preparing floor-cloth by means of a certain solidified or oxi-
dized oil, to which he gave the name "Linoleum." That word was, of
course, fanciful, and thus protectable.40 However, when the patent ex-
pired, it was held that the word "linoleum" "directly or primarily
means solidified oil [, and] only secondarily means the manufacture of
the plaintiffs, and has that meaning only so long as the plaintiffs are
the sole manufacturers. 41
III.
WHAT CAUSES GENERICIDE
Trademark holders, especially those who also have a patented
product, often encourage the public to use their trademarks as generic
"household words." However, their success in doing so can backfire
when consumers, over time, use these terms to identify the product
rather than its source. Indeed, as the Second Circuit noted, this gener-
icide process "can be a harsh one for it places a penalty on the manu-
facturer who has made skillful use of advertising and has popularized
his product. ' 42 That is just what happened to such well known prod-
ucts as "thermos, 43 "Toll House" (cookies), 44 "shredded wheat," 45
"escalator," 46 "cellophane," 47 and many more.
Sophisticated trademark owners know the kind of measures
which should be taken to prevent generic use of their marks. When a
new, innovative product is introduced, it's important to introduce not
just a brand name but also a generic name for the product as well, so
that the public doesn't have to use the brand name to identify compet-
ing products. Examples of this technique would be PALM PILOT
connected organizers, WALKMAN personal stereos, and ROLLER-
BLADE in-line skates. ESCALATOR might still be a protected
38 See supra text accompanying note 32.
39 Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch. D. 834 (1878).
40 Id. at 834.
41 Id. at 837.
42 King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963).
43 Id.
44 Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763 (D. Conn. 1983).
45 Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
46 Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (Comm'r. Pat. 1950).
47 DuPont Cellophane Co., Inc. v. Waxed Products Co., Inc., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936).
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trademark if the inventors had promoted the product as a "moving
stairway."48
Trademark owners should never use the trademark as a verb or
noun, which implies that the word is generic. Continual use of the
mark as a noun, rather than as an adjective identifying a particular
brand, can lead to degeneration of a trademark,49 especially if the
mark is used as a noun that is not capitalized. 50
Of course, using a trademark only as an adjective and not as a
verb is no guarantee that the mark will not be held to be generic. For
example, "Light Beer" and "Lite Beer" were held "to be generic
names for a type of beer light in body or taste and low in alcoholic and
caloric content."'51 The same thing happened with "matchbox" toys52
and "safari" clothing.53
If consumers and competitors have no word(s) other than the
trademarked word(s) with which to indicate the product at issue, no
one may have exclusive use of the mark. And the alternative term
must not be so unwieldy or complicated that the public will not accept
it.54
IV.
How Do TRADE NAMES BECOME GENERIC
In most cases cancellation of a trademark's federal registration
results from private litigation between the trademark owner and a
competitor. A declaratory action may be brought by a competitor
48 Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1965)
(not infrequently a manufacturer will recognize this danger too late, as was the case with
"Yo-Yo," which belatedly made a great effort "to fasten upon the toy the generic term,
'return top"').
49 See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 181 (1896) (owner referred
to its sewing machines merely as "Singers" in its advertising and promotion).
50 See, e.g., Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (80, 81 (Comm'r. Pat.
1950).
51 Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F. 2d 75, 79-81 (7th Cir.
1977).
52 J. Kohnstam, Ltd. V. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1960).
53 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 4-15 (2d Cir. 1976).
54 See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (D.C.N.Y. 1921) (consumers knew
only the word "aspirin," and did not know the term "acetyl salicylic acid"); see also DuPont
Cellophane Co., Inc. v. Waxed Products Co., Inc., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936). (similarly, the
availability of the phrase "transparent glycerinated cellulose hydrate regenerated from vis-
cose" did not prevent "cellophane" from being held to be generic); see also Q-Tips, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952) (alternative terms available, e.g.,
"medical swab," "applicator," or "cotton-tipped applicator," so term "Q-Tips ha[d] not
come to mean to the consumer the product double tipped applicator as distinguished from
a certain brand of applicator"); see also Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199
U.S.P.Q. 437 (D. Ore. 1978) (similarly, the availability of the descriptive "dictating ma-
chine" and "dictation equipment" prevented "Dictaphone" from becoming generic).
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against the trademark owner, seeking cancellation of the trademark.55
Genericness may also be used as a defense by a competitor in an in-
fringement action brought by the trademark owner.5 6
"There is a presumption in favor of a registered trademark, and
the burden of proof is upon one who attacks the mark as generic, but
the presumption can be overcome by a showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that the term was or has become generic. '57
V.
METHODS OF SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE TO GENERICIDE
In many of the cases where genericide occurred, the blame could
be placed primarily on the trademark owner himself. First and fore-
most, failure to give a new product an easily recognized generic name
in addition to the trademark name can lead to disaster down the road,
when it will be too late to convert the public to the use of some term
other than the trade-name term as the generic name of the product.
Over the years trademark owners must be constantly vigilant to
prevent generic use of their trademarks by competitors, consumers,
the media, dictionaries, and so on. Xerox, for example, has regularly
run ads in newspapers and magazines reminding the public to "photo-
copy" documents instead of "Xeroxing" them, and to produce "photo-
copies" instead of "Xeroxes. '58 Another approach is that of Johnson
& Johnson to follow its trademark with the word "brand," that is
"BAND-AID brand.59
Trademark owners should also be proactive in policing improper
usage of the mark, by promptly contacting any publications or com-
petitors who incorrectly use the mark in a generic sense, and request-
ing that there be no further improper usage. The Coca-Cola Company
has been notably aggressive in defending its trademark. Coca-Cola
employs people to visit retail establishments which do not serve Coca-
Cola products and specifically order Coca-Cola or a Coke. If the es-
55 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th
Cir. 1982).
56 See, e.g., Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch. D. 834 (1878).
57 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 684 F.2d at 1319 (1982) (citation
omitted).
58 See Xerox advertisement in June 2004 ABA Journal, at 14. ("When you use 'Xerox'
the way you use 'aspirin' we get a headache. There's a new way to look at it. Boy, what a
headache! And all because some of you may be using our name in a generic manner.
Which could cause it to lose its trademark status the way the name 'aspirin' did years ago.
So when you do use our name, please use it as an adjective to identify our products and
services, e.g. copiers. Never as a verb: 'to Xerox' in place of 'to copy' or as a noun: 'Xer-
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tablishment serves a cola-type beverage without comment, the Coca-
Cola employees send a sample of the beverage to Coca-Cola's labora-
tory for chemical analysis. If the beverage is determined to not be a
Coca-Cola product, the company will ask that retail establishment to
stop the deceptive practice. If the practice continues, Coca-Cola will
bring suit for trademark infringement.60
Even though a trademark has not become generic it may still be
the first thing consumers' think of in connection with the product.
One approach often used by competitors is to use an alternative ge-
neric name in connection with their products. For example, "Kleenex"
competitors can use the term "facial tissue"; "Chap Stick" competitors
can use the term "lip balm"; "Vaseline" competitors can describe their
product as "petroleum jelly. ' 61 Another possible strategy is to "plac[e]
a picture of the product on the front of the package, or ... us[e] see-
through packaging 62 ... ," as is done by "Frisbee" competitors. 63
VI.
TRADEMARKS WHICH MAY BE IN DANGER
As I discussed in Part 1,64 there are many trademarks which be-
came generic names for the products during the past 100 plus years.
There is every reason to believe that, despite the great efforts of many
trademark owners,65 some currently protected trademarks will be-
come generic and lose their protection. Among those that come read-
ily to mind, at least for me, as being in some danger of genericide, are:
Aqua-Lung (scuba equipment), Astroturf (artificial grass), Baggies
(food bags), Corn Flakes (cereal), Crock-Pot (slow cooker), Cuisinart
(food processor), Dixie cups (disposable cups), Dumpster (large trash
container), Fiberglass (glass fiber), Frigidaire (refrigerator), Frisbee
(flying disc), Go-Kart (mini racing cars), Hula Hoop (dancing ring),
Jacuzzi (whirlpool bath), Laundromat (self-service laundry), Magic
Marker (felt-tip marker),66 Masonite (fiberboard), 67 Milk Bone (dog
treats), Muzak (background music), Ping-Pong (table tennis), Plexi-
60 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982).
61 Folsom & Teply, supra note 7, at 1344.
62 Id. at 1345.
63 Id. note 103.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 3 and 4.
65 See supra Part V.
66 Speedry Products, Inc. v. Dri Mark Products, Inc., 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959) (ac-
knowledging 'Magic Marker' as still a registered trademark).
67 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) (recognizing 'Masonite' as a
registered trademark).
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glas (clear plastic sheets),68 Polaroid (instant photographs), 69 Post-It
(self-adhering note paper), Rolodex (rotary card file), Saranwrap
(transparent plastic wrap), Scotch tape (transparent adhesive tape),
Styrofoam (polystyrene filler), Tabasco (hot spicy sauce), Vaseline
(petroleum jelly), Velcro (re-usable fastening tape), Zamboni (ice re-
surfacing machine), Ziploc Bags (zipper storage bags), and Zodiac (in-
flatable boat). I have seen or heard people use all of these generically
to describe a product. While many of us realize that these were, and
perhaps still are, trademarks indicating the source of the products,
that aspect has lost most if not all of its importance. Despite that, our
diligent search has found no recent litigation involving these marks.
Perhaps the trademark owners have quietly acquiesced in genericide.
Perhaps there are no real competitors. Perhaps competitors have re-
frained from using these terms generically and have found other ways
to describe their products. It will be interesting to see what transpires
in the years ahead.
68 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Polycast Tech. Corp., 174 U.S.P.Q. 293 (D. Del. 1972) (holding
that the term 'plexiglas' is not generic).
69 Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1955) (holding that the term
'Polaroid' is not generic).
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